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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses a model of international trade under duopoly to investigate under which 
conditions a large country’s entrance on world markets can lead to lower and less quality 
diversity available to consumers rather than more.  In our partial model, autarky quality is 
proportional to the willingness to pay for quality and home market size, and inversely 
proportional to the cost of quality.  We formalize strategically interacting firms, and identify 
the context in which a low-quality producer can lead, driving high-quality producers out of 
the market. We discuss the feasibility of this ‘predatory strategy’ by an emerging country.  It 
is more likely in contexts where the emerging exporter is much larger and when the difference 
in willingness to pay for quality between countries is not too large.  
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Introduction 
 
Our theoretical paper answers the hypothetical question: “is the complete domination 
of a market by lower quality imported versions possible?” 
We attempt to explain under which conditions high-quality goods can be driven out of an 
open market by lower-quality alternatives, even though there are consumers willing and able 
to pay for quality.  Applying  industrial organization theory, we identify the 
particular conditions under which such an outcome may occur. Those conditions do not obtain 
in all product lines or markets.  In particular, this paper is not about the world market for 
luxury goods, especially not “Veblen” goods where a high price indicates the status of the 
consumer rather than the ratio price/quality of the good2. 
 
Over three decades of literature exists concerning world markets for vertically-
differentiated goods.  A large part of this literature is based on industrial organization models, 
e.g.: Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Motta (1993), Crampes and 
Hollander (1995), and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011).  
 
Using standard duopoly models of vertical differentiation, the trade literature provides 
four main results consistent with the industrial organisation literature about what happens 
when two same size countries with a monopoly firm in each open to trade. One, both firms 
respond to market incentives to change the quality they supply on the global market. Two, in 
equilibrium the two firms never chose to supply the same quality, as that would drive both 
firms’ profits to zero.   Three, there are multiple stable equilibria. But it is not possible to 
predict whether the firm in the country that has the lower quality in autarky will continue to 
supply low quality globally, or if it will “leapfrog” to supply the high quality product, or vice-
versa. Four, there is a two-way trade in different qualities identified as intra-industry trade3.  
 
Models of North-South trade such as Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987, or Flam and 
Helpman, 1987, predict a simple division of labour in which developed economy firms 
produce the more expensive high quality goods for high-end consumers, while emerging 
economy firms satisfy the demand for low-priced, lower quality goods. Two-way North-South 
trade allows high quality-loving consumers in both countries to obtain high quality goods, and 
low price customers in both countries to obtain lower quality goods. For Flam and Helpman, 
1987, another expected result of North-South trade should be an overall rise in quality of 
traded goods.  
Is this result obtained under all conditions, particularly if we consider the entry of a 
very large emerging country in international market? Is it possible that the producer of a less 
developed country, producing a lower quality, can squeeze out the higher quality good 
initially produced in the developed country? 
 
   In this paper, we theoretically answer these questions. As we further demonstrate, the 
domestic demand conditions are crucial: there is a direct relation between the difference in the 
sizes of the domestic markets and the feasibility that the firm producing the lower quality can 
impose a strategy that forces the higher-quality, smaller country firm out of the market. 
                                                 
2 Also, “lower” quality does not necessarily mean bad quality.  
3Krugman (1980) referred intra-industry trade as two-way trade in horizontally differentiated products while 
Brander, Krugman (1983) referred intra-industry trade as two-way trade in similar goods. However, in the type 
of models used in this literature, goods of different qualities belong to the same industry and it is possible to 
identify two-way trade as intra-industry trade.  
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Furthermore, differences in willingness to pay for quality between trading countries constitute 
a second determining element in this phenomenon. 
The importance of domestic demand conditions in determining the patterns of international 
trade has been recognized since Linder (1961). Linder hypothesized that suppliers tailor their 
products to the tastes of domestic purchasers.  To the extent that the mix of tastes elsewhere 
are similar, there will be intra-industry trade with other regions.  Krugman (1980) highlighted 
the “home market size effect” in a monopolistically competitive context. 
 
Motta, Thisse  and Cabrales (1997) showed the importance of domestic conditions for 
international trade in vertically- differentiated goods. Their canonical model consists of two 
firms in two countries with the same size populations. Consumers are characterized by their 
tastes and their willingness to pay for quality, which differ between countries. Quality is 
costly to produce.  Firms producing a good identified by a quality index compete strategically 
for shares of the global market in a two-stage game.  In the first stage firms simultaneously 
choose the quality to supply.  In the second stage they compete in a non-cooperative Cournot 
or Bertrand game. In equilibrium, two-way trade occurs but multiple Nash equilibria exist.  A 
“leapfrog” equilibrium cannot arise, however, if the difference between the two countries’ 
willingness to pay for high quality is sufficiently large. 
 Another paper explains how lower-quality goods can come to dominate open markets: 
Jansen and Faria (2002) showed that in an asymmetric information environment 
 where consumers are unable to recognize product quality without labelling, higher quality 
products will tend to disappear. If quality costs more to produce but consumers cannot 
distinguish high from low quality goods, this is not a surprising outcome. Our interest in this 
paper is to rationalize how it might occur even when consumers can recognize quality without 
explicit documentation. 
In sum, the existing international trade and industrial organization theories indicate 
that in a perfect information environment in which consumers have different tastes and 
different willingness to pay for quality, firms have incentives to differentiate supplies to 
satisfy the various global market demands.  The implication that free trade leads to greater 
quality diversity in each local market is also a consequence of the assumption that firms play 
a non-cooperative game in two stages, with simultaneous decision making at each stage. 
 The assumption that the trading countries are of similar size may be one critical 
weakness of the existing models. Given size differences, there is reason to doubt the validity 
of the assumption that strategic interaction is simultaneous. Why should a large country firm 
engage in a non-cooperative simultaneous game on a level-playing field when it exports to a 
much smaller market. With a huge domestic market, large economies of scale, and lower unit 
production costs, why wouldn’t such a firm behave as a leader, forcing small-market firms to 
adapt in response? In a world where firms in some countries enjoy huge domestic markets, it 
may be more realistic to assume that such firms assert their ability to lead, forcing smaller 
country rivals to follow their (quality, quantity) offers. 
This is what we assume in this paper. Our basic set-up is related to the one presented by Motta 
et al, 1997. Our partial equilibrium model consists of two countries, one small but implicitly 
rich, with a share of consumers willing to pay for higher quality, higher labor costs and lower 
fixed costs for producing high quality goods.  The other country is very large, has low labor 
costs, low willingness to pay for quality, and a high fixed cost to produce high quality goods.  
Giving these assumptions, in autarky the large country firm produces a lower quality 
compared to the small, rich country firm.  A difference in home market size is the first 
essential difference between our model and the existing literature.   
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The second essential difference is justified by the first about relative size.  Because of 
the low-quality producing country’s large home market size, it can credibly lead.  We 
formalize a Stackelberg-like game.  We show that a large country can choose the quality and 
quantity that forces the small country firm to exit the market.  Our model thus rationalizes 
how, in some sectors and under some conditions, a low quality product supplied by a large 
country can capture an entire market.  
 
We analyze the feasibility of this aggressive predatory strategy maximizing profit, and 
investigate the conditions of the stability of the equilibria of the game.  We show that the 
autarkic characteristics of the large country are primordial.  A large domestic market is 
essential. Even if countries have the same cost characteristics and face the same willingness to 
pay for quality, only a sufficiently large country’s firm can successfully follow a predatory 
strategy.   If the domestic market is large enough, the low quality-producing firm can export 
its autarky quality, wholly avoiding the costs of adapting quality to compete for just a share of 
the other country’s market. This contrasts with the existing finding in the literature that firms 
always have incentives to adapt the quality of their supplies to the global market when they 
open to trade.   Furthermore, when the small country/high quality producing firm adjusts its 
(quality, quantity) offer in an attempt to relax the competition on its own market and export 
on the foreign market, we find cases where its global market revenue is not sufficient to cover 
costs.  High quality production shuts down. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the partial 
equilibrium model and the autarky situation.  Section 3 analyzes the open market situation. 
Assuming the large country leads, we formalize a Stackelberg game in section 4, focusing on 
the (quality, quantity) strategy that nullifies the profits of the high quality producer, which we 
call a predatory strategy.  We analyze the feasibility conditions for the predatory strategy in 
section 5, focusing on the implications of size and differences in the willingness to pay for 
quality between trade partners.  In section 6 we compare the profitability of the predatory 
strategy to the profitability of the equilibria in the non-cooperative simultaneous game.  The 
last section concludes. 
 
 
2. The model and the autarky situation 
 
We model two countries, H (“Home”) and F (“Foreign”). On the supply side, in each 
country (j=H,F), a monopoly firm produces a vertically differentiated good. Firms incur a 
production cost 2jjj qcC =   that is quadratic in the quantity jq  produced in country j, and a 
fixed cost of quality 2jjju ukK =   that is quadratic in the quality ju  chosen by the firm in j .  
On the demand side, in each country  a continuum of  consumers  of “normal goods”4 
indexed by their taste5 for quality θ  are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, bj] with 
density Sj.   
Consumers either buy one unit or none at all.  Consumers of type θ  will buy one unit 
only if their net consumer surplus is positive, that is, only if θ uj -pj 0≥ , where pj  is the price 
of the good of quality uj.  In autarky, when just one quality ujA is available, consumers with θ  
                                                 
4 We exclude from our analysis the luxury goods consumers. 
5 Motta, 1993, p.115, underlines that θ  “can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income 
and quality” and that “under this interpretation the model proposed here is the analog of the models where 
consumers differ by their incomes rather than by their tastes”. 
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 buy one unit of the good.  Autarky market demand in each country is 
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bSq ,    j= H,F. 
 
In sum, there are four differences between the two countries: 
 
1) the willingness to pay for quality is lower in Foreign than in Home HF bb < . 
 
2) Foreign is larger: HHFF bSbS > ,  in contrast with the existing literature where countries 
have the same population, e.g.,  Motta, et al., (1997).  We normalize 1=HS .  
 
3) The marginal cost of production, cj , is lower in F than in H.  Normalizing that cost to zero 
in foreign implies 0  ,0 >= HF CC  .  
 
4) the fixed cost to produce a different quality is lower in Home: FH kk <<0 .   
 
Thus, we introduce significant asymmetry between countries, allowing us to define country H 
as a relatively small developed country with higher wages, more sophisticated consumers, and 
lower product line switching costs (due to, for example, pre-existing R&D or more flexible or 
productive infrastructure).  Meanwhile, country F is a big emerging country, with a relative 
abundance of labour and thus lower wages, and a large population of consumers less willing 
or able to pay for high quality. 
 
Given the fixed cost of quality, to maximize profits, firms will produce only one quality6.  
Profits are given by: 
jujjA
j
jAjA
jAjjA KCqS
uq
ub −−−= )(π . 
Maximizing jAπ  with respect to jAq  and jAu  we find that autarky quantity is: 
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and autarky quality is: 
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u
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Given 0=Fc  the autarky quality choice by F (1) simplifies to: 
        .
8
2
F
FF
FA k
bSu =       (2) 
 
                                                 
6 This is intuitive but proof is available under request. 
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F’s profit-maximizing quality is increasing in S and b, and decreasing in k, the fixed 
cost of quality  This implication contrasts with the usual explanation that emerging economies 
produce low quality goods strictly because their labour is low-priced.   Producing lower 
quality goods is also a rational choice when the domestic consumers have a lower willingness 
to pay for quality, and the fixed costs of quality are higher. 
Finally, recall that consumers with θ  higher than JAθˆ =
jA
jA
u
p
 will buy one unit of a good.   
Thus for a given population, the firm in the country where consumers have a higher 
willingness to pay for quality produces a higher quality, sold at a higher price.  This is a 
another significant implication of differences in domestic market size.  When there is a 
difference in the number of consumers in each quality range (density Sj) abstracting from any 
differences in consumers’ willingness to pay for quality (b) nor difference in the fixed cost of 
quality (k), the autarky quality produced by the firm in the larger country will be higher. 
To formalize the case in which the larger country produces the lower quality product 
in autarky,  we use (1) and (2) to obtain the conditions on SF  relative to bj, cH, and kj such that 
in autarky, F produces a lower quality than H. This condition is: 
 
               2
22
2
)3216(
1
FH
FHHHHHHH
F bk
kkcbbkcb
S
++−
<<    (3) 
For the remainder of this paper, we employ parameter values that are consistent with this 
initial condition. 
 
 
3. Free Trade 
 
When the two countries open to trade, both low and high quality versions become 
available to consumers in each country.  In each country j the consumer indifferent between 
buying the higher or the lower quality is indexed by: 
FH
FH
j uu
pp
−
−
=θ~  
 
Thus in each country, the domestic demand for the higher quality version (overscored D) is: 






−
−
−=
FH
FH
jjj uu
ppbSD                   j = H,F  (4) 
 
While demand for the lower quality version (underscored D) is: 
 
D 





−
−
−
=
F
F
FH
FH
jj u
p
uu
ppS   j = H,F  (5) 
 
When opening to trade, each firm faces a new set of demands due to the new variety in the  
willingness to pay for quality since FH bb ≠ , and the new number of consumers at each 
willingness to pay, since FH SS ≠ . 
 
The usual assumption in the industrial organisation literature is that firms have 
incentives to adjust quality to supply the global market.   To adjust they must pay a fixed cost.  
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Some authors assume that this adjustment cost depends on the difference between the autarky 
and open market quality. Unfortunately with this assumption, as Motta, et al, 1997 explain, it 
is impossible to find analytical results for the equilibria of the game; numerical simulation is 
required. For that reason we do not assume that adjustment costs depend on the magnitude of 
the change in quality. 
 
Following the seminal paper by Brander and Krugman (1983), in models of 
international trade under oligopoly where it is assumed that firms have constant marginal 
production costs, e.g., Venables (1990) and Motta et al (1997), firms segment the market in 
prices, then maximize global profit by choosing to supply one quality each, on both markets. 
Our assumption that production costs are quadratic rules out segmenting the market in prices.  
Given our assumed fixed cost of quality, firms choose to supply a single quality to both 
markets and the quantity that maximizes their own profit from the global market. 
 
Taking into account our assumption on strong asymmetries among countries and according to 
the findings in Motta et al (1997), we simplify the model by avoiding leapfrog equilibria 
because they are not selected when the differences between the trading countries are as large 
as we assume. The H-firm credibly plans to continue to supply the higher quality after F 
opens to trade7. 
 
From (4), global market demand for high quality version facing the H firm is: 


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

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−
−
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given SH normalized to 1, and assuming both qualities are available in both markets.  
Similarly, from (5), the global market demand for lower quality version facing the F firm is: 
        ( )F
F
F
FH
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p
uu
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The corresponding free trade prices when both versions of the good are transacted are thus: 
 
       
F
FFHFFHH
H S
uqqbSbup
+
−−+
=
1
)(     (8) 
                                          
F
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1
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Recall (see (4)) that demand for the high quality good in country F is positive only if 
FH
FH
F uu
ppb
−
−
> .  Given (8) and (9), we obtain that 
)1(
~
,
F
HFFH
FH
FH
FH S
qbSb
uu
pp
+
−+
=
−
−
=θ  , and 
the necessary condition for positive demand for the high quality good in country F is 
HFH qbb <− .  
 
It follows that there are differences in the willingness to pay for quality at which two-way 
trade will not occur. That is, although H may import low quality versions from F, it will not 
export high-quality versions to F.  In the following we assume parameter values consistent 
                                                 
7 This is also consistent with the expected division of labour in the models of North-South trade. 
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with positive demand for high quality versions among country F consumers, i.e., consistent 
with two-way trade. 
 
 
4. The Predatory Strategy 
 
Our objective in this paper is to challenge if higher quality versions of some goods 
might disappear from a developed country’s open market even when two-way trade is 
feasible.  We know that this outcome is not rationalized by assuming that firms play a two-
stage non-cooperative game, as in the existing literature.  In contrast, we assume that, in order 
to maximise its profit, a large country firm most profitably behaves as a Stackelberg leader 
who ultimately monopolizes the global market.  
We give the developing country a first mover advantage, especially for quality. This is 
not usual. It is assumed in general that innovation mainly takes place in developed countries 
where firms usually propose new high quality goods as leaders: they are “leaders in quality”. 
This does not mean that they move first in the game. Innovation takes time and rich country 
firms must adapt their quality/prices to poorer country consumers and lower willingness to 
pay for quality. 
We justify our assumption by the large size of the developing country. With a huge domestic 
market, large economies of scale, and lower unit production costs, why wouldn’t such a firm 
behave as a leader ? In a world where firms in some countries enjoy huge domestic markets, 
their exports to a small country represent a small part of their production and it may be 
realistic to assume that such firms assert their ability to lead, by rapidly offering their autarky 
quality and forcing smaller country rivals to follow their offers. 
 
 
The game proceeds in two stages. Similar to the Stackelberg game, anticipating the H-
firm’s best response, the F- firm commits to supply the quality and quantity that should 
nullify the H-firm’s profits.  In the second stage, the H-firm attempts to choose a quality and 
quantity that maximizes its profit.  
 As usual, this game is solved by backward induction.  .   
 
First solve the profit maximization problem of the H-firm, as anticipated by the F-
firm.  
We assume that the H-firm in the developed country always adapt the quality 
produced after trade is allowed. On the contrary, we will see further, in section 5, that the F-
firm can do it or not, depending of its domestic market size. Why do we introduce such an 
asymmetry ? First, the choice (adapt or not) is related to the cost of adapting quality. If 
developing a new quality had no cost, it would always be better to do it. We assume therefore 
that, with lower product line switching costs the H-firm has always incentives to adapt its 
quality after the market is opened while the F-firm bearing high cost of adapting quality has 
no incentives to adapt. Second, this assumption relies on the countries’ size difference.   
Facing a very large domestic market with a lower willingness to pay for quality, the F- firm 
has insufficient incentives to incur a high fixed cost of switching to higher quality to sell to 
the small Home market. At the opposite, the H-firm with low fixed cost of quality is 
concerned by the possibility to sell on a huge Foreign market by adapting its quality to  the F-
consumers8. 
                                                 
8 Analyses of this game assuming Home does not adapt results in theoretical outcomes inconsistent with the 
narrower diversity and lower open market quality outcome we seek to explain.  If  Home does not adapt, (i) for 
(bH - bF) very large, the necessary condition for positive demand for the high quality good in country F 
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 Assuming that the H-firm will adapt its quality ( HAH uu ≠ ), H-firm profit is: 
2))(( HHHHHHH ukqqcp −−=π  
With free trade and both goods consumed in both countries, the open market price pH is given 
by (8).  Rearranging, profit is: 
 
( ) 2
1 HHHHF
FFHHFFH
HH ukqcS
uquqbSb
q −





−
+
−−+
=π   (10) 
 
The H-firm is assumed to choose the quality Hu  and quantity Hq  that maximize Hπ .  The 
first order conditions with respect to Hu imply that: 
)1(2
)(
FH
FFHHH
H Sk
bSqbqu
+
+−
=      (11) 
 
Expressing Hπ  in terms of this expression for uH we have: 
 


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
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1 22222
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The H–firm also chooses the production quantity that maximizes its profit.  Let HF qq λ=  
( 0>λ ). The first order condition with respect to the profit maximizing quantity is: 
 
0
)1(2
)1(232()3(2)1(4
2
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


+
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λπ
    
Of the three solutions for Hq , the one consistent with a negative second derivative is: 
( ))1(16)1(32233
4
1 2222
FFHFHHFFFFHHFFHH SukSckSbSbbbSbbq ++++++−+= λ    (13) 
Equations (11) and (13) express the H-firm’s profit-maximizing response in terms of 
the quality Fu  and quantity Fq choice variables of the F-firm, and the relevant parameters.  
Note that one obtains the same results by first maximizing Hπ  with respect to Hq . 
 
Now, solve the “predatory strategy” problem of the F firm.  Is there a pair ),( FF uq  
which nullifies Hπ ?    
 
                                                                                                                                                        
( HqFbHb <− ) is not verified. Without adaptation, poor country consumers cannot buy the H-firm high quality 
good  and Home serves its domestic market only; (ii) at lower (bH - bF), there is a threshold SF  at which Home 
also serves only its domestic market, and (iii) with (ii) and a larger SF, there is leapfrogging, also leading to 
higher quality in the open market than in autarky. Proofs are available from the authors on request. 
For that reason, the remainder of this paper focuses on the cases in which Home does adapt. 
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Denote HF qq λ= and express the value function for Hπ  in terms of Hq  as given by(13).   
This results in an expression for Hπ  in terms of the parameters ( ),,, jHjF kcbS as well 
asλ and F’s choice of Fu .  Finding the value of λ  that nullifies this H-firm’s profit by 
equating Hπ ( FjHjF ukcbS ,,,,, λ ) to 0, we obtain: 






++++++−+
+
= 2222
2
)1(12)()()1(12)((
)1(18
11
FHHFFHFFHFHHFFH
HF
SckbSbbSbSckbSb
Sku
λ
 
With this value of λ  in (13), the expression for Hq  is: 
222222 )1(12)(8)1(1921717(99[
12
1
FHHFFHFFFHHFFHFFHH SkcbSbbSSkcbSbbSbq +++++++−+=
 22 )1(12)(834( FHHFFHFFH SkcbSbbSb +++++ ]     (13’) 
 
Setting  HF qq λ= , we obtain  =Fq 





Fu
G    with 






++++++−+
+
= 2222 )1(12)()()1(12)((
)1(18
1
FHHFFHFFHFHHFFH
FH
H SckbSbbSbSckbSbSk
qG
            (14) 
In sum, this is a game in which the F-firm is able to drive the H-firm profits (12) to 
zero by offerring Fq . Fu = G.  Clearly, when the F-firm offers the pair (qF , uF) such that 
Fq . Fu = G + ε, the H-firm’s revenues will not cover costs, which drives the higher quality 
version out of  the market. 
 
5. The feasibility conditions for a predatory strategy 
 
The predatory strategy by the firm in country F is to offer a pair { Fq , Fu }such that 
Fq . Fu = G   (14).   
 
  Under what conditions can the F-firm successfully--most profitably-- implement this 
strategy while producing the lower quality version of the good?  If the F-firm adapts quality 
( FAF uu ≠ ), given our normalizations, its profit is 
2)( FFFFF ukqp −=π .  
 
 Using (9) to express the open market price of the low quality good, we have: 
( ) 2
1 FFF
FFHFFH
FF ukS
uqqbSbq −





+
−−+
=π    (15) 
 
Alternatively, if the F-firm simply specializes in and exports its autarky quality, then it avoids 
the cost of adapting quality. In this case: 
   ( ) 





+
−−+
=
F
FAFHFFH
FF S
uqqbSbq
1
π     (15’) 
Thus there are two alternatives. The F-firm either does, or does not, adapt its quality when it 
emerges as an exporter on the world market. 
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We analyze each in turn. 
 
First alternative: Foreign firm exports its autarky quality 
 
Proposition  1: 
 
The emergent countries able to play a predatory strategy by exporting their autarky quality  
must be sufficiently large (have a high density of population). The threshold density for a 
feasible predatory strategy is positively related to rich country consumer’s willingness to pay 
for quality ( Hb ). 
 
The F-firm can drive the H-firm out of the market by proposing a pair Guq FF =.  
where G depends on the characteristics of the countries (14). The higher is the willingness to 
pay for quality in the rich country (the higher is Hb  relatively to Fb  ) and the lower is the cost 
of production in the rich country (the lower is cH), the larger is G, and the more difficult it is 
for an F-firm to successfully follow a predatory strategy. 
 
When the F firm exports its autarky quality when it behaves as a leader in open 
market, it is constrained by the trade-off formalized in (14).  The lower its autarky quality, 
FAu ,  the higher quantity, Fq , must be to conform with Guq FAF =. .  Nevertheless, its 
production cannot exceed the global market size net of the supply by the H-firm: 
)( HFFHMaxF qbSbq −+=           (16)  
In consequence, the minimum autarky quality in country F consistent with a predatory 
strategy is:  
min 
)( HFFH
FA qbSb
Gu
−+
=       (17) 
From (2) we know that  
F
FF
FA k
bSu
8
2
= , which must be higher than the minimum as per (17) . 
This allows us to express the magnitude of market density, SF , necessary for a successful 
predatory strategy by the F firm exporting its autarky quality.  
 By successful predatory strategy, we mean =Hπ 0  (10), and that the F-firm’s profit (15’) is 
higher than under any other strategy.  It follows from (17) and (2) that in order for the F firm 
to be able to propose a pair Guq FF =.  leading to =Hπ 0,  SF must be sufficiently large, i.e., 
it must be that: 
>FS )(
)8(
2
HFFHF
F
qbSbb
kG
−+
.            (18) 
 
We illustrate via simulation how the autarky quality (given by (2)) and the minimum autarky 
quality consistent with a predatory strategy by country F (17) vary with the density, FS .  
Consider 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk .   These values of the parameters 
are consistent with (3).  Figure 1 illustrates the feasibility of the predatory strategy when the 
F- firm exports its autarky quality at different levels of SF 
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 uFA                   
  
Figure 1. Autarky quality in Foreign, uFA, compared to the minimum quality choice required 
for a successful predatory strategy (Min uFA) with respect to Foreign size SF,  assuming bH = 
5, bF = 3, cH = 3, kF = 0.8, kH = 0.3.  
 
The steeper (red) line in Figure 1 illustrates that Foreign autarky quality is directly 
proportional to its size, as explained in the second section of this paper.  The shallower line 
(blue) represents how the minimum quality consistent with an implementable predatory 
strategy summarized by Guq FAF =.  varies with respect to FS . On and under the shallower 
line, ≤Fπ 0. With the illustrated parameter values, the F-firm cannot behave as a predator 
exporting its autarky quality when it is small, up to 4.2≤FS . At larger size, Foreign’s 
autarky quality (2) exceeds the minimum quality that satisfies (17)  for a successful predatory 
strategy.   This underscores our finding that the emerging country must be sufficiently large to 
be able to implement the predatory strategy.  
 
The main result is that among emergent countries that have the same cost of quality, cost of 
production, and their own consumers’ willingness to pay for quality, only sufficiently large 
emergent countries-- with sufficiently high FS --  are able to implement a profit-maximizing 
predatory strategy while exporting their autarky quality. 
 
Alternatively, when rich country consumers are willing to pay even more for quality (higher 
values of Hb ), the minimum quality of exports from the emergent country ( FAumin ) for a 
successful predatory strategy must also be higher, or the emergent country density must be 
higher, to succeed with a predatory strategy.  
 
This is illustrated by comparing Figures 2 and 1. Figure 2 is generated using the same 
parameters as Figure 1, except that Hb  = 7 in Figure 2.  Note also that (3) is satisfied through 
14<FS .  Figure 2 shows the higher size of F ( 5.4=FS ) consistent with a successful 
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predatory strategy in F’s autarky quality when the difference in the willingness to pay for 
quality is larger. 
 
                uF 
 
Figure 2. Autarky quality in Foreign, uFA, compared to the minimum quality required for a 
successful predatory strategy (Min uFA) with respect to Foreign size SF; assuming bH = 7 (all 
else the same as in Figure 1)   
 
 
Second alternative: the Foreign firm adapts quality to supply the global market 
 
Proposition  2: 
 
The emergent country playing a predatory strategy will choose to adapt quality to the new 
open market when the differences between country willingness to pay for quality and market 
densities are sufficiently small.  Nevertheless if the difference in densities is large, the 
emergent country firm can successfully dominate the market by exporting its autarky quality. 
 
 Now consider the alternative that the Foreign firm adapts and exports a different 
quality FAF uu ≠  while satisfying Guq FF =. .  In this case the Foreign firm incurs the fixed 
cost of quality, and Fπ is defined as in (15). 
 
 Using the value ofλ which nullifies the Home firm’s profit, the corresponding value of 
Hq  (13’), and setting == HF qq λ 





Fu
G  in (15), the value of Fπ  depends on the parameters 
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( ),,, jHjF kcbS and is only a function of Fu . We find the level of quality that maximizes the 
Foreign firm’s profit by satisfying the first order condition  0=
∂
∂
F
F
u
π .9 
For parameter values 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk , Figure 3 illustrates 
Foreign firm’s profit under the predatory strategy as a function of density FS , comparing 
“adapt quality” to the “don’t adapt quality” alternative. 
 
πF 
 
Figure 3. F-firm profits under “adapt quality” and “don’t adapt” alternatives with respect to 
density FS , given bH = 5, bF = 3, cH = 3, kF = 0.8, kH = 0.3.  
 
 At low levels of FS  the Foreign firm maximises profit by adapting quality to the new 
open market (the red curve).  At larger FS  the Foreign firm maximises profit by exporting its 
autarky quality (the blue curve).  Given the parameter values illustrated, the alternatives are 
equally profitable at FS =2.9. Above that size, exporting the autarky quality is implementable 
(see Figure 1) and more profitable.  Facing a very large number of domestic consumers with a 
low willingness to pay for quality in Foreign, the Foreign firm has insufficient incentives to 
incur a fixed cost of switching to higher quality to sell to the Home country consumers, if the 
difference between the countries’ willingness to pay for quality is not too large. 
Moreover, it is straightforward to underline that if the developing country firm has 
higher cost of adapting quality, all else equal, the “adapt quality” strategy is never possible 
(the red curve goes down when the value of kF  increases). 
 Consider how this result varies with respect to bH. As the willingness to pay for quality 
in Home, Hb ,  rises, it is less likely that the Foreign firm can implement a successful 
predatory strategy.  But there is still a Foreign size at which the predatory strategy dominates. 
As shown in Figure 4, with Hb =7, all else equal, the predatory strategy is not profitable at all 
for 2≤FS .  For 2 < SF < 5.2, the Foreign firm has the incentive to adapt quality (again if the 
cost of adapting is not too large) and serve more Home consumers.  
                                                 
9 Details of the calculations are available on request to the authors. 
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 The market size effect dominates after SF > 5.2.   Above that size the F-firm is able to 
implement the “not adapt” alternative (see also Figure 2) and most profitably exports its 
autarky quality in a predatory strategy. 
 
πF 
 
Figure 4. Foreign firm profits under alternative predatory strategies (adapt, not adapt) with 
respect to SF , given parameters bH = 7, all else equal to Figure 3.  
 
 In this section we showed the conditions under which a ‘predatory’ strategy is 
possible. Our model rationalizes the possibility of the dominance of an open market by lower 
quality versions of normal goods following the entrance of a very large, relatively poorer 
country.  The size of the emergent country is key, as is the relative willingness to pay for high 
quality and the Stackelberg assumption of leadership.   
 When the emergent country is small, as we shall show in the next section, its most 
profitable strategy is to play a non-cooperative game.  That results in the more diverse quality 
outcomes that have been predicted by the existing literature.   
 
 When the emergent country is large enough relatively to the size of its trade partner 
(depending on other parameters), its firm is able to maximize profit by implementing a 
predatory strategy in which it simply exports its autarky quality when it opens to trade.   
The critical size is increasing in the willingness to pay for quality in the Home country, but 
there is always a sufficiently large size of the foreign country at which the predatory strategy 
is the most profitable.  The best response to the predatory strategy in Home leaves the high 
quality firm with zero profit, ultimately driving it out of the marketplace.  The ultimate 
outcome is exclusively lower quality goods after the emergence, compared to before.  This is 
a possible outcome in some normal good markets where the willingness to pay for quality is 
weak in the rich countries. The intuition is that for some goods, even rich consumers know 
that the use of their purchases will not last and that they will have to soon renew the good 
(e.g., child clothing and footwear, toys). Their willingness to pay for quality is weak. When 
Home consumers really care about quality, because of safety reasons (for example on the tire 
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market or the medicament sector), a predatory strategy is not possible and both high and low 
quality goods are offered on open markets.   
 
 
6. Comparison with the simultaneous non-cooperative Cournot Game 
 
The F-firm will implement a predatory strategy if and only if its profit, given by (15) 
or (15’) is higher under that strategy than under any other strategy.   
 In this section, for purposes of comparison, we investigate the profitability for the F-
firm if the monopoly firms in the two countries play a non-cooperative game when they open 
to trade, as in the existing literature.   In the first stage they simultaneously choose qualities uH  
and uF and in the second stage they compete in quantities qH and qF.   
 
 Assuming, as in the existing literature, that both firms adapt quality to the open 
market, the firms’ profits are as usual, given by equations (10) and (15).  We solve by 
backward induction.  First, find the production quantities that maximize their respective 
profits.  The first order condition solutions consistent with a negative second derivative are: 
 
)4)1(4(
)2)((
FHFH
FHFFH
H uuSc
uubSbq
−++
−+
=       and   
)4)1(4(
))1(2)((
FHFH
HFHFFH
F uuSc
uScbSbq
−++
++++
=  
 
Substituting these expressions into Hπ  and Fπ we obtain: 
( ) 2
2
22
)4)1(4)(1(
)2)(1((
HH
FHFHF
FHFHHFFH
H ukuuScS
uuScubSb
−







+−+−+
+−+++
=π    (19) 
And    ( ) 22
22
)4)1(4)(1(
)1(2((
FF
FHFHF
FHHFFHF
F ukuuScS
ScubSbu
−







+−+−+
+++
=π      (20) 
 
 At the first stage, the firms simultaneously choose the quality to supply to maximize 
these profit equations. The first order condition solutions consistent with negative second 
derivatives are the Nash equilibria of the game.  
The analytical expressions of the equilibria (available on request) are prohibitively difficult to 
solve analytically.  We can more easily compare the Foreign firm’s profits from a non-
cooperative game strategy to its profit from the alternative predatory strategies via simulation.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates how the strategy rankings vary with respect to density SF. We show 
Foreign firm’s profit as a function of FS  from both alternative predatory strategies compared 
to profits when it participates in a simultaneous non-cooperative game. 
  
 We show that at low levels of FS (small differences between countries’ densities) the 
Foreign firm maximises profit by playing the non-cooperative game. This outcome is 
consistent with the existing literature. When its density FS  is larger than 1.9, the Foreign firm 
maximises profit with the predatory strategy alternative in which it adapts quality.  
At levels of FS  higher than FS =2.9, it is most profitable for the F-firm to implement the 
predatory strategy with its autarky quality, relying on its large market size, as shown in the 
previous section. 
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 As seen, this threshold size is directly proportional to the difference in the willingness 
to pay for quality.  This is illustrated in Figure 6.  When Hb  is raised to 7, all else equal, the 
predatory strategy is not profitable below 2.5=FS . However, once again, even with a 
significant difference between the willingness to pay for high quality, the effect of that 
difference is ultimately overwhelmed by the difference in size.  In Figure 6 the size effect 
dominates after 2.5>FS . Above that size the F-firm can most profitably export its autarky 
quality in a predatory strategy. Note also that when Hb =7, the F-firm predatory strategy 
alternative “adapt” is dominated at all values of  FS . 
   
 
 
Figure 6. Foreign firm profits with respect to SF under both predatory strategy alternatives and 
the non cooperative strategy; bF = 3, kH = 0.3, cH = 3, kF = 0.8, bH = 7. 
2 3 4 5 6
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Figure 5: Foreign firm profits as a function of SF for both predatory strategy alternatives and the 
non cooperative strategy, 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk  
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Conclusions 
 
 In this paper we asked the hypothetical question: “is the complete domination of a 
market by lower quality imported versions possible?” 
We have showed under which conditions a large country’s lower quality exports might 
dominate a market, or, how free trade can lead to lower quality and less diversity on open 
markets, rather than more. That kind of outcome was not rationalized by existing theories on 
the provision of quality under international competition.   
We used an industrial organization approach presenting a two different size country 
partial model with a vertically differentiated duopoly . 
 The size of the emergent country is key, as is the relative willingness to pay for high 
quality.   
 When the emergent country is not too much larger than its trade partner, we have 
shown that its most profitable strategy is to play a non-cooperative game (section 6).  Thus, 
when the countries opening to trade are relatively similar in size, the outcome to be expected 
is a two-way-trade, more quality diversity, including high quality, on the open market.  This is 
in accordance with the literature analyzing intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated 
goods, assuming similarly-sized countries and a non-cooperative game market structure.   
Our proposition 1 shows the importance of the market size effect. When the emergent 
country is very large, we have shown that it maximizes profit by implementing a predatory 
strategy in which it exports its autarky quality when it opens to trade, avoiding the high cost 
of adapting quality, at the condition that the willingness to pay for quality in the other country 
is not too high. The size at which a predatory strategy can succeed is directly proportional to 
the trading partner’s willingness to pay for quality, but there is always a sufficiently large size 
at which the predatory strategy is most profitable for the emerging country.  
The best response to the predatory strategy in the relatively smaller country can leave its high 
quality producers unable to cover costs, ultimately driving them out of the marketplace.  
        Proposition 2 shows again that the size of the emergent country’s domestic market is 
essential.  At lower differences in the countries’ sizes, the larger country firm must adapt its 
quality in order to play a predatory strategy. But there is a thresholds of the fixed cost of 
adapting quality where the “adapt strategy” is not possible. In that case, as usually, the 
Foreign firm maximises profit by playing the non-cooperative game. 
 
While our analyses have provided plausible answers to our question, we have also 
opened new lines of inquiry for future research.   
One,  domestic market size can be even more important than costs or wages, i.e., 
incomes, in explaining the quality of goods exported by emerging countries.  This is 
empirically testable.   
Other further theoretical lines can also be considered. 
Our model assumes quantity competition. This is important because under price 
competition the Stackelberg leader has a first mover advantage, and also because in trade 
models quantity and price competition sometimes deliver different predictions. One should 
discuss the possible different impact of price competition assumption. 
At last our analysis is  a partial equilibrium model. Particularly, in the line of the 
literature using standard duopoly models of vertical differentiation, we consider trade between 
two asymmetric countries. We know that we are in a multi-country world. Wouldn't third 
markets that supply and demand high quality goods undo the results? Future research must 
verify how robust are our results to a multi-country world. 
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